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Welmerink: 401(k) Loans in Bankruptcy

COMMENT
CLEANING THE MESS OF THE MEANS
TEST: THE NEED FOR A CASE-BYCASE ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOANS IN
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
INTRODUCTION
How much money will you need in retirement to maintain your current lifestyle? Many financial planners suggest that you may need at
least 70% to 80% of your current annual income to maintain your way of
life, while others say the figure is closer to 100% or more.1 As a result of
the declining economy, balances in retirement accounts are roughly 25%
lower than they were before the recession.2 However, experts suggest
that even before the recent recession most Americans were not saving
enough for retirement.3 Because Social Security alone will not provide
adequate retirement income for most people, and fewer companies are
offering traditional pension plans, a 401(k) plan has become an essential
part of the average worker’s retirement.4 As a result, more than 40 million U.S. workers have saved for retirement through the help of 401(k)
plans.5
Although there are numerous tax incentives to continued investing
1

TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 18 (2003).
Editorial, About Your 401(k), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/24/opinion/24mon1.html?scp=16&sq=&st=nyt.
3
Id.
4
TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 9 (2003).
5
Id. 401(k) savings plans are a way in which employees can contribute pre-tax earnings
toward retirement. This money earns interest while invested and cannot be taken out before the age
of 59½ without harsh penalties. Many participants have said that the 401(k) has helped them save
thousands of dollars that they otherwise would have spent carelessly. Id. at 15.
2

121
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in a 401(k) plan, and the penalties for early withdrawal are harsh, some
participants have found it necessary to access this money before retirement. One of the only ways to avoid paying a federal penalty for early
withdrawal, and in some states an additional state penalty, is to borrow
money through a 401(k) loan.6 In fact, “[t]he most recent industry surveys show that about 20 to 25 percent of eligible employees have outstanding loans.”7 Unfortunately, even with 401(k) loan assistance, some
borrowers have filed for bankruptcy due to overwhelming debt. Although the remaining funds in a 401(k) are protected from creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding,8 funds that were borrowed through a 401(k) loan
have not received the same treatment.9 This discrepancy is unduly prejudicial for petitioners with 401(k) loans trying to get a fresh start in
bankruptcy.
Recent changes to the Bankruptcy Code10 have made it nearly impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for a debtor with monthly income
greater than the median income in his or her state11 to successfully petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.12 Since the passage of the Bankruptcy
6

Many 401(k) participants choose to take a 401(k) loan over a traditional unsecured loan for
a number of reasons: there are minimal qualifications and credit requirements to obtain a 401(k)
loan; the interest rate charged is nominal, and in most plans the interest paid is deposited back into
the account; most loans allow for a five-year repayment plan through automatic deductions from the
employee’s paycheck; and many plan providers can have a loan funded within a matter of days. Ron
Lieber, When Credit Gets Tight, a 401(k) Loan Becomes Tempting, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2008, at C1;
IWASZKO, KNUTE AND BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 188 (1999). According to the
IRS, a participant may borrow from a 401(k) retirement plan without tax penalties or liability if three
criteria are met: 1) the amount borrowed is limited to 50% of the vested account balance, or $50,000,
whichever is less; 2) the loan is repaid within five years, unless the loan is used to purchase the participant’s main home; and 3) the loan repayments are made in substantially level payments, at least
quarterly, over the life of the loan. 401k Resource Guide – Plan Sponsors – General Distribution
Rules, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov/retirement/sponsor/article/0,,id=151926,00.html (last visited
Oct. 22, 2010).
7
Ron Lieber, When Credit Gets Tight, a 401(k) Loan Becomes Tempting, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 2008, at C1.
8
11 U.S.C.A. § 522 (Westlaw 2010).
9
Similarly, voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans have received varied treatment in bankruptcy petitions. See James Winston Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement Accounts Are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010) (arguing that
voluntary contributions to retirement accounts can be reasonably necessary expenses).
10
11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1527 (Westlaw 2010). Unless otherwise noted, all references to the
Bankruptcy Code, Code, or § are to Title 11 of the United States Code.
11
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010). No party in interest to the bankruptcy proceeding, nor a judge, may file a motion for dismissal under § 707(b)(2) for those petitioners with a current monthly income equal to or less than the median family income for a comparable household,
thereby precluding this group of petitioners from the application of the means test.
12
For a more detailed overview of Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions and the means test, see
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or Rebutting
the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245 (2009).
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),13
courts have differed on the question whether monthly repayments to a
401(k) loan are deductible as “Other Necessary Expenses”14 under the
“means test”15 of Chapter 7 when determining a petitioner’s monthly
disposable income.16 In courts that do not recognize a deduction for
401(k) loan repayments, the means test may not accurately calculate a
debtor’s ability to repay creditors.17 Thus, in those courts, a Chapter 7
petition will likely be wrongly dismissed for being presumptively abusive of the provisions of Chapter 7. As a result, courts err in not allowing a means-test deduction for 401(k) loan repayments.
This Comment examines the relevant case law regarding Chapter 7
petitions and the policy implications of not considering 401(k) loan repayment a necessary expense. Section II provides an overview of the
treatment of 401(k) loans in bankruptcy, as well as a more detailed review of means testing and an analysis of Other Necessary Expenses.
Section III argues that courts should look to the facts and circumstances
surrounding petitions to determine whether 401(k) loan repayments can
be deducted as necessary expenses, and that doing so will not affect the
ability of courts to properly dismiss abusive petitions under a totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis. This Comment concludes that a 401(k) loanrepayment deduction may be proper, and therefore a case-by-case analysis of a Chapter 7 petition is equitable for debtors subject to the means
test.

13

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Chapter 11 of the United States Code).
14
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010) (allowing a deduction for the “actual
monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal
Revenue Service”).
15
The “means test” is a mechanical calculation to determine whether a presumption of abuse
of the provisions of bankruptcy attaches.
16
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (Westlaw 2010).
17
There are two reasons those courts may misinterpret a debtor’s ability to repay creditors:
(1) these monthly repayment amounts are necessary expenses and should be statutorily deducted
from the debtor’s monthly disposable income under § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), and therefore the courts are
incorrect in their mathematical calculations of debtors’ disposable income under the means test; and
(2) 401(k) loan repayments are generally mandatorily deducted from an employee’s paycheck, and
those courts essentially require that debtors cease repayment of these loans, treating the remaining
loan balances as early withdrawals, and pay the federal penalties (and in some cases additional state
penalties) associated with early withdrawal, thereby imposing additional unfair penalties on debtors.
Requiring an employee to pay early withdrawal penalties may leave less than 50% of what the court
considers available to creditors.
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I.

BACKGROUND

A.

THE MEANS TEST OF THE BAPCPA AND 401(k) LOAN TREATMENT

Chapter 7 bankruptcy “discharges the debtor from all debts that
arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter.”18 For
decades, Congress debated reform in an attempt to prevent petitioners
from completely discharging debts in favor of the repayment of creditors.19 After a long and arduous road to reform, Congress passed the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA).20 The BAPCPA is meant to address abuses of the bankruptcy process and to steer debtors away from Chapter 7 into Chapter 13
plans where they will be forced to repay a portion of their debts.21 While
passing the BAPCPA was difficult,22 the practical application of the
18

11 U.S.C.A. § 727(b) (Westlaw 2010). Procedurally, upon the filing of either a Chapter 7
or Chapter 13 petition, an automatic stay is triggered that prevents creditors from collecting payment
from the debtor. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010). For example, the automatic stay prevents
the enforcement of judgments, or the collection, assessment, or recovery of a claim against the petitioner. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2), (6) (Westlaw 2010). While protecting the debtor from his or her
creditors during bankruptcy proceedings, the automatic stay is not a complete bar of any action
against the debtor. It does not protect against the commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner or civil proceedings and related collections with issues of paternity,
child custody, marriage, or domestic violence. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1), (2)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2010).
19
Congress, and creditor lobbyists, had considered means testing as an element of bankruptcy reform in every session since 1997. Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New §707(b),
79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 231 (2005). For a general discussion of the political battles over bankruptcy reform in the 1990’s, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the
News Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2004), and Robert J. Landry, III, The Policy and Forces Behind Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: A Classic Battle over Problem Definition, 33 U. MEM. L. REV.
509 (2003). This debate was largely due to the increased number of bankruptcy petitions as a whole,
and more specifically, the significantly increased number of Chapter 7 petitions through the 1990’s.
Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191,
191-92 (2005).
20
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Chapter 11 of the United States Code).
21
See In re Hardacre, 338 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (stating that the intent of
the BAPCPA was to prevent “easy access to chapter 7 liquidation proceedings by consumer debtors
who, if required to file under chapter 13, could afford to pay some dividend to their unsecured creditors”). Chapter 7 is most commonly compared to Chapter 13 bankruptcy, in which a debtor generally projects his or her future financial circumstances for a period of three or five years, depending
upon the current monthly income of the debtor as compared to the median income of a similar-size
family, and submits a plan to repay creditors. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(4) (Westlaw 2010). A Chapter
13 plan must be approved by the court, and upon completion of the repayment period, any remaining
debts will be discharged. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (Westlaw 2010).
22
During remarks, proceedings and debates of Congress while attempting to pass the
BAPCPA, many politicians and other individuals stood up in stark opposition to the Act. For exam-
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BAPCPA’s principles is proving to be even more laborious.23 The most
significant change was the addition of the means test: a mechanical calculation used to objectively determine whether a petitioner is abusing the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 24 The means test was purposely designed to make it more difficult to obtain a total discharge of unsecured
debts in a Chapter 7 proceeding.25
A petition must be dismissed, or converted to a petition under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13, if the court determines that it constitutes an abuse
of the Bankruptcy Code for an individual filing under Chapter 7 with
primarily consumer debts.26 The means test provides the calculation for
determining whether a presumption of abuse arises.27 For certain individuals, there are safe harbors in which the means test is not applied.28
Safe-harbor provisions apply when (1) the petitioner is a debtor with
“current monthly income” below the median household income in his or
her state,29 or (2) the petitioner is a disabled veteran.30 However, even if
ple, The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard of California remarked, “This bill would negatively affect
millions of hard-working Americans, particularly veterans and victims of identity theft. The
[BAPCPA] is a bad bill because it favors credit card companies at the expense of hard-working
Americans, veterans, and victims of identity theft. It creates a means test which would make it impossible for families to be protected even when they have suffered debt due to illness or unemployment, preventing them from being able to start over in life. While the bill makes it harder for these
individuals to eliminate their debt, it unnecessarily strengthens the hands of creditors. For example,
this bill does not guarantee that hard-working parents can make child support payments over credit
card debt payments.” 151 CONG. REC. E838-04 (daily ed. May 2, 2005) (statement of Hon. Lucille
Roybal-Allard).
23
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or
Rebutting the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245, 246 (2009).
24
Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 771 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
25
Id.
26
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
27
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010) (stating “the court shall presume abuse
exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii),
(iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of--(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,025, whichever is greater; or (II) $11,725”).
28
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(D), (b)(7) (Westlaw 2010).
29
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010). To determine whether a petitioner falls within
this first safe-harbor provision, the petitioner must look to his or her income for the past 6 months,
average that income, and place it onto Form 22A, the “Abuse Test” form. Robert C. Meyer, Chapter
7 and Chapter 13 Issues 3-4, http://www.robertcmeyer.com/PDF/Chapter7and13issuespdf.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2010). The average six-month income figure is called the “current monthly income”
(CMI). 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A) (Westlaw 2010). According to the census bureau, median income
varies
significantly
by
state.
State
Median
Income,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). The
lowest median income reported for the years 2007-2009 for three-year average medians is $36,650
in Mississippi; the highest median income reported for the years 2007-2009 for three-year average
medians is $66,654 in New Hampshire. Id. When filing for bankruptcy and submitting the appropriate financial paperwork, income, in a factual context, is commonly difficult to determine with the
loss of jobs.
Robert C. Meyer, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Issues 5,
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the safe-harbor provisions shield the petitioner from the means test’s presumption of abuse, a court may still dismiss a petition on procedural
grounds for unreasonable delay, lack of proper payment of fees, or a failure to provide the required documents.31 The court may also dismiss a
petition if it determines that under a “totality of the circumstances” the
individual should not benefit from Chapter 7 bankruptcy.32
If the debtor’s current monthly income is greater than the median
income of his or her state, thereby excluding the debtor from the safeharbor provisions, the court then uses the means test to determine the
amount that the debtor can repay to his or her creditors.33 Under the
means test, the court deducts the total amount of the debtor’s statutorily
approved monthly expenses from the debtor’s current monthly income.34
This final figure is the debtor’s monthly disposable income, i.e., the
amount of money every month with which the debtor can repay his or
her creditors after paying for things such as living expenses, food, and
insurance.35 The monthly disposable-income figure is then multiplied by
sixty to determine how much money the debtor has to pay back to his or
her creditors over a five-year period.36 If the debtor’s five-year disposable income is less than the lesser of either (1) 25% of the debtor’s unsecured debts or $7,025, whichever is greater, or (2) $11,725, then the debtor may remain in Chapter 7.37 If the debtor’s five-year disposable
http://www.robertcmeyer.com/PDF/Chapter7and13issuespdf.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2010). This
creates problems in that a petitioner who has recently been terminated from employment will have
no current monthly income, yet the average of his or her income over the past 6 months may be significant. So while the petitioner has no current money to pay rent, bills, or creditors, the petitioner
will likely not be able to successfully file for bankruptcy. Id. at 3-4. This is especially true today.
In its worst economic state since the Great Depression, the unemployment rate is at 9.6%. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—September 2010
(Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
30
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010).
31
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(a) (Westlaw 2010).
32
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(c) (Westlaw 2010). In determining whether to dismiss a petition or
convert it to Chapter 13, the court may look to whether the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s financial situation demonstrates abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
33
Robert J. Landry, III, The Means Test: Finding a Safe Harbor, Passing the Means Test, or
Rebutting the Presumption of Abuse May Not Be Enough, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 245, 256-57 (2009).
34
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2010). The deductions stated include, but are not
limited to, expenses for health and disability insurance, reasonably necessary expenses to maintain
the safety of the debtor and his or her family from family violence, expenses for food and clothing,
and actual expenses for the care of an elderly, ill, or disabled household member.
35
For a list of all deductions allowed, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2010).
36
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010). The court looks to the debtor’s ability to
repay creditors over a five-year period in order to determine whether the debtor is better suited for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Chapter 13 petitioners are required to provide for repayments to creditors
over a five-year period. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(4) (Westlaw 2010).
37
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2010) . The statutory amounts of $7,025 and
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income does not meet this test, the presumption of abuse arises, and if it
is not rebutted, the debtor must amend his or her petition to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, or the petition will be dismissed.38
In other words, if the debtor’s monthly disposable income is less
than approximately $120 ($7,02539 over 60 months), the presumption of
abuse does not arise.40 If the debtor’s monthly disposable income is
greater than approximately $200 ($11,72541 over 60 months), then the
presumption of abuse arises.42 Finally, if the debtor’s monthly disposable income is between about $120 and $200, the presumption of abuse
does not arise if this amount over 60 months is not sufficient to pay at
least 25% of the debtor’s “nonpriority unsecured claims.”43
As one bankruptcy court explained, by enacting the BAPCPA Congress clearly lowered the standard for dismissal of Chapter 7 petitions;
however, pre-BAPCPA case law applying these concepts is still helpful
in determining whether a debtor is abusing Chapter 7 bankruptcy.44 The
means test is a statutory expansion of the concept that only a “needy”
debtor is entitled to Chapter 7 liquidation relief.45 This concept is directly related to the reduction of the standard for dismissal under §
707(b) from “substantial abuse” to “an abuse” of Chapter 7 relief.46
Bankruptcy scholars have noted that “[t]he mathematical formula
incorporated from §707(b)(2) is unrelated to the provisions of the proposed [Chapter 13 bankruptcy] plan and bears no obvious relationship to
the amount of money that will actually be available from the debtor for
payments to unsecured creditors if the plan is confirmed.”47 If a debtor’s
$11,725 are adjusted for inflation every three years. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Westlaw 2010).
38
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010). A discussion of rebutting the presumption of
abuse is beyond the scope of this Comment.
39
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw 2010).
40
Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
41
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (Westlaw 2010).
42
Thompson, 370 B.R. at 765.
43
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw 2010); Thompson, 370 B.R. at 765. “Nonpriority unsecured claims” is another way of saying the debtor’s unsecured debt. For example, if a
debtor had a monthly disposable income of $150, he or she would be able to repay $9,000 over a
period of 60 months. The presumption of abuse would not arise for such a debtor if his or her unsecured debt was greater than $36,000 (25% of $36,000 is $9,000). However, if such a debtor had
unsecured debt of $24,000, the presumption of abuse would arise (25% of $24,000 is $6,000, and the
debtor has the ability to pay more than $6,000 over the following 60 months).
44
In re Mestemaker, 359 B.R. 849 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
45
In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 434 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983 (8th Cir.
1989); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 914 (9th Cir. 1988).
46
The rules for dismissal under pre-BAPCPA law, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1984), allowed for
dismissal of a bankruptcy petition where the granting of relief would be a “substantial abuse” of the
provisions of Chapter 7. This was one of the most controversial changes in the BAPCPA.
47
Keith M. Lundin & Henry E. Hildebrand, III, Section by Section Analysis of Chapter 13
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Chapter 7 petition is dismissed, his or her only remedy in bankruptcy is
to formulate and propose a plan under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13.48
Courts will sometimes look to how much money will be available to
creditors in a proposed bankruptcy under Chapter 13 when determining
whether a debtor should be allowed to remain in Chapter 7; however, this
calculation might not accurately reflect the amount of money available to
creditors.49 The most significant controversy that courts are called upon
to resolve is whether a debtor’s expenses are deductible from the debtor’s current monthly income. Petitioners have attempted to deduct
401(k) loan repayments as payments on account of “secured debts” under
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), but courts have gone to great lengths to explain how
401(k) loans are neither “debts” nor “secured debts.”50 Courts reason
that a debtor’s obligation under a 401(k) loan is “essentially a debt to
himself – he has borrowed his own money.”51 Despite the valiant efforts
that petitioners have put forth to argue that 401(k) loan repayments are
secured debts, courts have consistently held that debtors may not deduct
401(k) loan repayments for purposes of the means test in hopes of avoiding the presumption of abuse.52

After BAPCPA, SL068 ALI-ABA 65, 98 (July 21-22, 2005).
48
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (Westlaw 2010).
49
See In re Walker, 2006 WL 1314125 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (recognizing that a debtor
with a fully unsecured second mortgage would be entitled to deduct the full amount of the contract
payments under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), however, the debtor would not actually be required to make the
secured payments on the second mortgage while in a Chapter 13 case).
50
See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Villarie (In re Villarie), 648 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir.
1981) (an annuitant’s withdrawal from the savings account of annuity fund is not a “debt”); Bolen v.
Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 400-01 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (vast majority of courts have held that a debtor’s
obligation to repay retirement account loan is not a “debt” under the Code); Eisen v. Thompson, 370
B.R. 762, 769 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (majority view is that retirement plan loans are not secured debts);
McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 195 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“there is a clear consensus that an individual’s pre-petition borrowing from his retirement account does not give rise to a secured or unsecured
‘claim,’ or a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 152 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1999) (“clear consensus” that borrowing from retirement account do not give rise to either
secured or unsecured “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Fulton, 211 B.R. 247, 264 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1997) (funds borrowed from a debtor’s pension plan do not constitute a debt, and the pension plan has no right of repayment against the debtor or the debtor’s property that can be classified
as a secured claim under the bankruptcy laws); In re Scott, 142 B.R. 126, 131-32 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1992) (no “debt” exists between the debtor and an ERISA pension plan); In re Jones, 138 B.R. 536,
537-538 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (advance is not a debt because the city’s administrative code did
not give the System the right to sue the debtor for the amount of the advance).
51
E.g., In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (“the debtor’s obligation to repay
a loan from his or her retirement account is not a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Smith,
388 B.R. 885, 887 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (a debtor is borrowing from himself because “there is no
separate entity to whom the debt is owed”); McVay, 371 B.R. at 195-97 (citing numerous cases following the same reasoning).
52
Id.
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OTHER NECESSARY EXPENSES UNDER THE MEANS TEST

Before the BAPCPA, former § 707(b) warranted dismissal only if
the bankruptcy petition constituted a substantial abuse of Chapter 7.53
Under the former Act, courts generally followed one of two tests: either
(i) they evaluated whether an expense was reasonably necessary under a
“totality of the circumstances” test,54 or (ii) they mechanically looked to
the debtor’s “ability to pay” creditors in full over the three-year term of a
Chapter 13 plan.55 Courts that used the ability-to-pay rule were quick to
adopt a per-se rule that expenses such as 401(k) loan repayments were
not necessary under former § 707(b).56 In those courts that adopted the
ability-to-pay rule, the determination to dismiss a Chapter 7 petition for
substantial abuse was based on the amount of disposable income available and the percentage of unsecured debts that would be discharged in a
hypothetical Chapter 13 plan.57 Some courts held that a debtor left with
any surplus income, no matter the surrounding circumstances, justified
the dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition.58 These courts ignored
whether an expense was reasonably necessary.
In contrast, the courts that adopted the totality-of-the-circumstances
test for substantial abuse offer more guidance in determining whether the
repayment of 401(k) loans is a necessary expense. Courts that utilized
the totality-of-the-circumstances test generally looked to the facts and
circumstances of the case before allowing or disallowing a deduction
from a debtor’s current monthly income.59 These courts did not analyze
each specific expense to determine whether it was reasonably necessary;
instead, a number of factors were used to determine if a petition
amounted to a substantial abuse of Chapter 7 bankruptcy in light of the
53
See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
312, 98 Stat. 333, 355 (1984).
54
See, e.g., In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 201 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) (finding the appropriate standard in evaluating the deductibility of retirement account contributions and loan repayments
is the totality-of-the-circumstances test).
55
See, e.g., In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. 178, 180-81 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that the ability-to-pay approach avoids debtors getting a “head start” rather than a “fresh start”); In re Edwards,
50 B.R. 933, 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that a debtor who can repay principal to his or her
creditors is not suffering from sufficient economic hardship to warrant use of Chapter 7).
56
Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 204.
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429, 438 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding no bright line for dismissal under the ability-to-pay test); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[A] finding
that a debtor is able to pay his debts, standing alone, supports a conclusion of substantial abuse.”); In
re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1988) (the ability-to-pay approach is fully in keeping with
Congress’s intent in enacting § 707(b)).
59
Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 206.
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totality of the circumstances.60 For example, the Fourth Circuit enumerated some of these considerations, including the following:
(1) Whether the bankruptcy petition was filed because of sudden illness, calamity, disability, or unemployment; (2) Whether the debtor
incurred cash advances and made consumer purchases far in excess of
his ability to repay; (3) Whether the debtor’s proposed family budget
is excessive or unreasonable; (4) Whether the debtor’s schedules and
statement of current income and expenses reasonably and accurately
reflect the true financial condition; and (5) Whether the petition was
61
filed in good faith.

The Fourth Circuit further noted that the debtor’s ability to repay creditors is the primary factor to be considered, and this determination must
be made on a case-by-case basis.62
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit applied the totality-of-the-circumstances
test and calculated a debtor’s disposable income by starting with current
monthly income and subtracting amounts “reasonably necessary to be
expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor.”63 The Ninth
Circuit found that because the Code did not define the phrase “reasonably necessary” or provide examples of reasonably necessary expenses,
the court had to analyze the petition based on the debtor’s specific circumstances in order to decide whether a claimed expense was required
for the debtor’s maintenance or support.64 According to these decisions,
before the BAPCPA, courts had free rein to look to the facts and circumstances surrounding debtors’ financial situations rather than applying
per-se rules disallowing particular deductions. The BAPCPA, in effect,
removed this power from the courts and statutorily dictates what is reasonable or necessary.65
By enacting the BAPCPA, Congress provided bankruptcy courts
with more categorical guidance as to what constitutes a necessary expense. Under the means test, “[t]he debtor’s monthly expenses shall be
the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly
60

Green v. Staples (In re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1991).
Id.
62
Id.
63
Hebbring v. U.S. Trustee, 463 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(2) (2000)), superseded by statute, BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005), as recognized in Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
64
Id.
65
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010); I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10 (2009) (setting forth
the statutory categorical deductions allowed as Other Necessary Expenses).
61
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expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued
by the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”66 The National Standards, promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, include categorical deductions
for food, housekeeping supplies, apparel and services, personal care
products and services, and miscellaneous expenses.67 Local Standards,
issued and published by the United States Trustee,68 generally include
deductions for housing, transportation, and utility expenses.69 Other Necessary Expenses are outlined in the IRS’s Internal Revenue Manual,
which lists fifteen categories of expenses that may be considered necessary.70 The IRS’s list is non-exhaustive, as evidenced by Internal Revenue Manual section 5.15.1.10(1)’s “necessary expense test.”71 The test
instructs that “[o]ther expenses may be considered . . . [but] they must
provide for the health and welfare of the taxpayer and/or his or her family or they must be for the production of income.”72
Bankruptcy Form 22A is the procedural form in which petitioners
enter financial information to determine whether the Chapter 7 presumption of abuse arises.73 Form 22A also lists categories of Other Necessary
Expenses, which include taxes, health care, and involuntary deductions
for employment.74 Under the involuntary deductions for employment
66
67

(2005).

11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010).
Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 254

68

These amounts vary by State, County, Census Region, family size, and expense type. The
allowable local expenses are published through the U.S. Trustee Program website.
69
Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231, 255
(2005).
70
I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10. These fifteen categories include accounting and legal fees, charitable
contributions (donations to tax exempt organizations), child care (babysitting, day care, nursery and
preschool), court-ordered alimony payments (alimony, child support, including orders made by the
state, and other court ordered payments), dependent care (for the care of the elderly, invalid, or handicapped), education, involuntary deductions, life insurance, secured or legally perfected debts, unsecured debts, taxes, optional telephones and telephone services (pager, call waiting, caller identification or long distance), student loans, internet provider/e-mail, and repayment of loans made for
payment of federal taxes. Each category of deductions has different requirements to be considered
“necessary,” e.g., regarding expenses for unsecured debt: “If the taxpayer substantiates and justifies
the expense, the minimum payment may be allowed. The necessary expense test of health and welfare and/or production of income must be met. Except for payments required for the production of
income, payments on unsecured debts will not be allowed if the tax liability, including projected
accruals, can be paid in full within 90 days.” Id.
71
I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1).
72
I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1).
73
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007 requires that the debtor file a schedule of assets and liabilities, a
schedule of current income and expenditures, and a statement of financial affairs as prescribed by the
appropriate Official Forms.
74
Official
Bankruptcy
Form
22A,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_022A_0410.
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category, the Form advises petitioners to “[e]nter the total average
monthly payroll deductions that are required for your employment, such
as retirement contributions, union dues, and uniform costs. Do not include discretionary amounts, such as voluntary 401(k) contributions.”75 While Form 22A provides some guidance, there is no express
mention of 401(k) loan repayments. Furthermore, although the language
of the Form is helpful, the form language is not binding on the courts if it
conflicts with statutory language.76
Even though the National Standards, Local Standards, and the IRS’s
Other Necessary Expenses currently provide more-concrete categories of
necessary expenses, courts still find room to disagree as to what are considered “reasonably necessary” expenses.77 While it is no longer debated
that 401(k) contributions cannot be deducted from income in Chapter 7
bankruptcy petitions under the Internal Revenue Manual or Form 22A,78
courts still disagree about whether 401(k) loan repayments are deductible.
C.

JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOAN REPAYMENTS AS NECESSARY
EXPENSES

Few courts have directly addressed the deductibility of 401(k) loan
repayments as Other Necessary Expenses. Some courts have avoided the
issue altogether by excluding the deduction on other grounds. 79 For example, multiple bankruptcy courts have held that 401(k) loan repayments
pdf; see also 11 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3D Rules Form 22A (2010). Some of the other categorically necessary expenses include life insurance, court-ordered payments, education for employment or for a physically or mentally challenged child, childcare, and telecommunication services.
75
Id. at l. 26.
76
In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
77
Compare In re Herbord, Nos. 07-60311, 07-60331, 2008 WL 149972 *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ill.
Jan. 14, 2008) (finding that the provisions in the Internal Revenue Manual are not applicable, and
denying the deduction for a vehicle ownership expense), with In re Buck, No. 07-31513-KRH, 2007
WL 4418145 *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2007) (finding that Form 22C in a Chapter 13 petition
requires the court to allow a deduction for a vehicle ownership expense).
78
The Internal Revenue Service guidelines provide, “Contributions to voluntary retirement
plans are not a necessary expense.” I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10. For a detailed analysis of the treatment of
401(k) and other retirement account contributions in Chapter 7 and 13 petitions, see James Winston
Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement Accounts Are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010).
79
See, e.g., Bolen v. Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 402 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (not addressing Other
Necessary Expenses but denying a 401(k) loan-repayment deduction from Form 22A); Eisen v.
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 768-72 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (not addressing the issue of 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary Expenses and dismissing the petition on other grounds); In re Smith, 388
B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (denying a petition because petitioners did not rebut the presumption under special circumstances while not addressing Other Necessary Expenses).
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are not deductible under the means test because 401(k) loans do not meet
the traditional definition of “secured debts.”80 The bankruptcy court in
In re Thompson briefly addressed this issue and found that 401(k) loan
repayments were deductible payments on account of “secured debts.”81
Reasoning that payments for debts are specifically excluded from deduction under the means test, the court found that 401(k) loan repayments
could not otherwise have been deducted as Other Necessary Expenses.82
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s holding on the basis
that 401(k) loans are not “secured debts,” leaving unresolved the deductibility of 401(k) loan repayments as necessary expenses.83
In the courts that have directly addressed 401(k) loan repayments as
Other Necessary Expenses, the majority have generally held that such
payments are not deductible under the means test.84 In some courts, petitioners have tried to deduct 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary
Expenses under the “involuntary deductions for employment” section of
the Internal Revenue Manual and/or Bankruptcy Form 22A.85 For exam80
In these cases, debtors attempted to deduct their monthly repayments from current monthly
income under 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (Westlaw 2010) as payments on secured debts. However, courts have consistently held that 401(k) loans do not qualify as “secured debt,” and therefore
any payments toward a loan from a 401(k) were not deductible. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys.
v. Villarie (In re Villarie), 648 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1981) (an annuitant’s withdrawal from the
savings account of the annuity fund is not a “debt”); Bolen, 403 B.R. at 400-01 (vast majority of
courts have held that a debtor’s obligation to repay retirement account loan is not a “debt” under the
Code); Thompson, 370 B.R. at 769 (majority view is that retirement plan loans are not secured
debts); McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 195 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (“there is a clear consensus that an
individual’s pre-petition borrowing from his retirement account does not give rise to a secured or
unsecured ‘claim,’ or a ‘debt’ under the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Esquivel, 239 B.R. 146, 152
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (“clear consensus” that borrowing from retirement account do not give
rise to either secured or unsecured “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code); In re Fulton, 211 B.R. 247,
264 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (funds borrowed from a debtor’s pension plan do not constitute a debt,
and the pension plan has no right of repayment against the debtor or the debtor’s property that can be
classified as a secured claim under the bankruptcy laws).
81
In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d sub nom. Eisen v.
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
82
Id.
83
Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 767 n. 9 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that because the
debtors did not challenge the holding that loan repayments cannot be considered Other Necessary
Expenses on appeal, the district court could not consider the issue).
84
See, e.g., Egebjerg v. Anderson (In re Egebjerg), 574 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding that 401(k) loan repayments are not the same kind and character as deductions for the health
and welfare of the debtor allowed elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Manual); In re Lenton, 358
B.R. 651, 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding that 401(k) contributions are voluntary and not deductible, and therefore repayment of past voluntary contributions should receive the same treatment); In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that 401(k) loan repayments are not mandatory payroll deductions in Form 22A or the Internal Revenue Manual).
85
See, e.g., Barraza, 346 B.R. at 730 (finding that 401(k) loan repayments are not mandatory
payroll deductions in Form 22A or the Internal Revenue Manual).
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ple, in In re Barraza, the bankruptcy court held that retirement account
loan repayments taken from an employee’s wages were not “mandatory
wage deductions,” and therefore could not be deducted as Other Necessary Expenses.86 Similarly, the court in In re Lenton analyzed alleged
“involuntary deductions” under both the Internal Revenue Manual and
Bankruptcy Form 22A. The court found that the debtor’s monthly
401(k) loan payment was not a condition of employment.87 Likewise, in
In re Egebjerg, the court explained that a debtor could treat an outstanding 401(k) loan as an early withdrawal from a 401(k) plan, thereby
relieving any future repayment obligation; therefore, the court found that
the loan repayments were completely voluntary.88
The Egebjerg petitioner also attempted to deduct his 401(k) loan repayments on the ground that a loan-repayment plan was necessary to
preserve a debtor’s “health and welfare.”89 The petitioner argued that replenishing the amount of the loan to his 401(k), which would otherwise
have been out of the reach of his creditors, was necessary because he was
approaching retirement and the 401(k) plan was his only significant asset.90 The court quickly dismissed his claim because 401(k) loan repayments “are not of the same kind and character as those expenses allowed
elsewhere under [Internal Revenue Manual] § 5.15.1.10.”91 The court
further explained that those expense categories of the Internal Revenue
Manual are allowed to be treated as deductions only if there is no alternative to paying the expense.92 Additionally, the court noted that 401(k)
contributions are not, in and of themselves, a necessary expense; therefore, the repayment of 401(k) loans should not be a necessary expense.93
Finally, some petitioners have argued that the disallowance of a deduction for 401(k) loan repayments causes discrepancies within the Code
that lead to contradictory outcomes for deductions.94 Accordingly, petitioners have said that Congress’s intent in passing the BAPCPA was to
include 401(k) loan repayments as necessary expenses in order to avoid

86

Barraza, 346 B.R. at 730.
Lenton, 358 B.R. at 657-58 (stating that a condition for employment would require that but
for the expense the debtor would not be able to perform his or her job).
88
Egebjerg, 574 F.3d at 1051.
89
Id. at 1051-52.
90
Id. at 1051.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
E.g., In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 655-59 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006) (addressing petitioner’s
claim that not deducting 401(k) loan repayments creates a discrepancy among 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b),
1322(f), and 362(a)).
87
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inconsistency.95 The Lenton petitioner, for instance, argued that excluding the deduction of a 401(k) loan payment materially alters the terms of
the loan in violation of § 1322(f) of the Bankruptcy Code.96 Section
1322(f) states “[a Chapter 13] plan may not materially alter the terms of
a [401(k) loan] and any amounts required to repay such loan shall not
constitute ‘disposable income’ . . . .”97 The court found that § 1322(a)
provides for the submission of future earnings,98 and channeling debtors
into Chapter 13 upholds the congressional intent to protect creditors
without altering the loan.99
In the same way, the Lenton petitioner argued that the automatic
stay of § 362(a)100 does not stop the continued payment of every other
necessary expense; therefore, § 362(b)(19), which precludes that automatic stay from stopping the repayment of 401(k) loans, would be rendered superfluous if such repayments are not treated as necessary expenses.101 The petitioner claimed that 401(k) loan repayments would be
the “only expenses in which the automatic stay does not apply and which
[also could not] be taken as an allowable expense in the Means Test.”102
In other words, the petitioner pointed out that creditors were barred from
collecting money used to pay expenses for things such as legally perfected debts, unsecured debts, or taxes.103 But, the petitioner would be
required to continue paying his 401(k) loan repayments during the bankruptcy proceedings without any protection for those payments. The court
reasoned that 401(k) loan repayments are finite and will eventually be
95

Id.
Id. at 659.
97
11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(f) (Westlaw 2010).
98
11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a) (Westlaw 2010) (emphasis added).
99
Lenton, 358 B.R. at 660.
100
The automatic stay prevents creditors from collecting money owed by the petitioner while
bankruptcy proceedings are in progress. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010). For example, the
automatic stay prevents the enforcement of a judgment obtained against the petitioner where the
judgment was obtained before the filing of bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(2) (Westlaw 2010).
Similarly, it prevents any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the petitioner that arose
before the commencement of the bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(6) (Westlaw 2010). While protecting the debtor from his or her creditors during bankruptcy proceedings, it is not a complete bar of
any action against the debtor. The automatic stay does not protect against the commencement or
continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioner. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b)(1) (Westlaw
2010). Similarly, it does not protect the debtor against civil proceedings surrounding, or collections
following, issues of paternity, child custody, marriage, or domestic violence. 11 U.S.C.A. §
362(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Westlaw 2010).
101
Lenton, 358 B.R. at 659.
102
Id.
103
These are used as an example of generally accepted necessary expenses, set forth in I.R.M.
§ 5.15.1.10, which are subject to the automatic stay requirement of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw
2010).
96
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paid off; thus, excluding the deduction of 401(k) loans from the means
test establishes a “wait and see” approach that will channel petitioners
into Chapter 13.104
As indicated, courts have used numerous justifications to deny the
deduction of 401(k) loan repayments under the means test. Until recently, no court had enunciated a per-se rule on the issue, which led to
differing results. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit became the first court to
adopt a rule that 401(k) loan repayments are per se an unnecessary expense.105 Because the Ninth Circuit provided only cursory justification
for the denial of deductions for 401(k) repayments, there is room for
courts in other circuits to follow a different interpretation and hold that
401(k) loans can be deducted from current monthly income under the
means test.
II.

THE NEED FOR A CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS OF 401(k) LOAN
REPAYMENTS UNDER THE MEANS TEST

Although several courts have disallowed the deduction of 401(k)
loan repayments under the means test, their logic is flawed for two reasons. First, when courts have held that 401(k) loan repayments are not
for the “health and welfare” of debtors, they have taken an extremely limited view, refusing to examine exigent circumstances that could prove
the debtors’ “health and welfare” contentions. Second, when courts have
held that the congressional intent behind the BAPCPA was to completely
exclude 401(k) loan repayments, they have overlooked the fact that this
exclusion causes discrepancies within the Code, rendering portions of the
Code unnecessary. Furthermore, courts that have denied the deduction
for 401(k) loan repayments have not always been clear in their reasoning
or have convoluted the issue in order to avoid ruling on the merits of petitioners’ claims.106 Nothing in the Code or Internal Revenue Manual
limits the definition of Other Necessary Expenses as long as the neces104

Lenton, 358 B.R. at 660.
In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
106
See, e.g., id. at 1051 (not considering that the deductions in the Internal Revenue Manual
are non-exhaustive); Bolen v. Adams, 403 B.R. 396, 402 (N.D. Miss. 2009) (dismissing the petition
on the grounds that 401(k) loans are not “secured debts”); Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 768-72
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (not addressing the issue of 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary Expenses
and dismissing the petition on other grounds); McVay v. Otero, 371 B.R. 190, 197 (W.D. Tex. 2007)
(basing dismissal on the “secured debt” deduction and “special circumstances” while not addressing
Other Necessary Expenses); In re Smith, 388 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) (denying a deduction and finding that there can be no special circumstances besides medical conditions or a call to
active duty in the Armed Forces that can rebut the presumption of abuse); In re Mowris, 384 B.R.
235, 237-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008) (denying a deduction where 401(k) loan repayments are not a
condition of employment deductible as a mandatory payroll wage deduction).
105
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sary expense test is met. Additionally, there may be facts and circumstances, such as a petitioner nearing retirement with no other significant
assets, that support considering 401(k) loan repayments as necessary for
the health and welfare of a petitioner. For those reasons, petitions should
be looked at on a case-by-case basis to determine whether 401(k) loan
repayments should be deducted as Other Necessary Expenses under §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Even if a court determines 401(k) loan repayments are not deductible for the “health and welfare” of the debtor, other circumstances may
exist that require a court to look to the facts and circumstances surrounding a petition. Therefore, a rule that 401(k) loan repayments are per se
unnecessary expenses is unfair to petitioners. Prior to the BAPCPA,
judges and appellate panels had the ability to look at the facts and circumstances of each Chapter 7 petition to determine whether a 401(k)
loan repayment was a necessary expense based upon the petitioner’s financial situation. This individualized examination of petitions should
not change simply because Congress chose to provide more specific
guidance as to what qualifies as a necessary expense. It is unfair for petitioners subjected to the means test to lose the ability to show other circumstances that require the repayment of 401(k) loans. However, courts
continually refuse to look beyond their limited analysis to see the effect
this reasoning has on a petitioner’s ability to afford retirement.
This Section of this Comment argues that 401(k) loans could be
considered Other Necessary Expenses based upon the facts and circumstances of a petitioner’s financial situation. There is an inherent conflict
between the current approach and public policy, creating practical problems of disallowing the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments. Because
of these concerns, this Section concludes that the totality-of-thecircumstances test of § 707(b)(3) gives courts sufficient authority to dismiss abusive Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions, and that the heavy scrutiny
of 401(k) loan repayments under the means test is unnecessary and ultimately a waste of judicial resources.
A.

COURTS SHOULD LOOK TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS TO DETERMINE WHETHER
401(k) LOAN REPAYMENTS COULD BE DEDUCTED AS OTHER
NECESSARY EXPENSES

For more than twenty years bankruptcy courts and appellate panels
looked at the facts and circumstances surrounding a debtor’s financial
situation before determining whether an expense would be considered
necessary. Through the BAPCPA, Congress provided a more objective
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approach to determining which expenses should be “necessary,” through
the National Standards, Local Standards, and Other Necessary Expenses
determined by the IRS.107 However, Congress’s inclusion of examples of
deductible expenses in the legislation does not preclude a court today
from determining whether an expense is necessary for any individual petitioner. Additionally, courts are instructed to look to the facts and circumstances of a petition when testing for abuse under the totality-of-thecircumstances test of § 707(b)(3).108 Even though these two tests are distinct, the same case-by-case approach should be undertaken in analyzing
deductions under the means test.
The Internal Revenue Manual’s examples of “other expenses” categorically pass the necessary expense test of section 5.15.1.10(1).109 One
categorical necessary expense is the involuntary wage deduction, which
is necessary as long as it is “a requirement of the job; e.g., union dues,
uniforms, work shoes.”110 Courts have commonly found that the repayment of loans on a 401(k) plan is not a requirement of the job, but rather
is a completely voluntary wage deduction and therefore not a necessary
expense.111 However, courts consistently neglect to acknowledge the Internal Revenue Manual’s explicit necessary expense test used to evaluate
whether other expenses could be considered necessary. The IRS’s categorical standards and examples of other expenses are merely a small
sample of what is a non-exhaustive list of potential necessary expenses.
The Internal Revenue Manual advises that “[o]ther expenses may be allowed if they meet the necessary expense test. The amount allowed must
be reasonable considering the taxpayer’s individual facts and circumstances.”112 Accordingly, in order to properly evaluate an expense under
the necessary expense test, a court should look to the petitioner’s individual facts and circumstances.
Some bankruptcy courts have ruled that the list set forth in the Internal Revenue Manual section 5.15.1.10 is exhaustive for purposes of
the bright-line means test because Congress expressly limited deductions
to the categories specified by the IRS.113 However, other courts have
107

11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (Westlaw 2010).
In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 770-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007).
109
In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 657 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
110
I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10 (2009).
111
See In re Egebjerg, 574 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Lenton, 358 B.R. at 657; In re
Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (quoting I.R.M. § 5.15.1.10(1) and finding that
“The Monthly Loan Payment is not a condition of Debtor’s job, but rather a condition of his
Loans”).
112
I.R.M. § 5.15.1.7(6) (2009).
113
In re Mordis, No. 06-42590-293, 2007 WL 2962903, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 9,
2007); In re Turner, 376 B.R. 370, 375 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007); In re Whitaker, No. 06-33109, 2007
108
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considered the applicability of the necessary expense test of section
5.15.1.10(1) on a case-by-case basis.114 One district court in the Ninth
Circuit went so far as to say:
After 1984, a debtor’s expenses were either “reasonably necessary” or
they were not. . . . If that was true after 1984, it is a fortiori true after
2005, at least in the case of debtors with income above the median.
For those debtors . . . the determination of disposable income is now
meant to be a simple and straightforward matter of arithmetic based on
sections 707(b)(2)(A) and (B). Debtors may claim applicable expenses
[in the means test] under the IRS National and Local Standards, and
may also claim actual Other Necessary Expenses, without any judicial
consideration of whether those expenses are in fact “reasonably neces115
sary.”

Under this reasoning, any applicable expense categorized as Other Necessary Expenses can be deducted when determining disposable income.
In practice, however, what constitutes Other Necessary Expenses varies
greatly among bankruptcy court opinions.116 Because of the confusion in
defining necessary expenses, courts should look to the facts and circumstances surrounding a debtor’s financial situation before applying a perse rule disallowing the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments.
In In re Barraza, for example, the bankruptcy court held that retirement account loan repayments from wages are not mandatory wage
deductions.117 Thus, they cannot be considered deductible as necessary
expenses under either the “Other Necessary Expenses: mandatory payroll
deductions” category of Form 22A or the involuntary wage deduction
expense of the Internal Revenue Manual.118 The court also found that
401(k) loan repayments are not deductible under the category of “UnseWL 2156397, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 25, 2007); In re Lara, 347 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2006).
114
In re Mowris, 384 B.R. 235, 238-39 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2008); Lenton, 358 B.R. at 658.
115
In re Chavez, No. 07-60567-13, 2007 WL 3023145, at *5 (Bankr. D. Mont. Oct. 11,
2007). Although the petitioner in that case filed under Chapter 13, the operative rules of Chapter 13
allow debtors to deduct those “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended . . . in accordance
with subparagraphs (A)(ii) of paragraph (2) of section 707(b)” when determining “disposable income” under section 1325(b)(2). See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)(3) (Westlaw 2010).
116
E.g., James Winston Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary Contributions to Retirement
Accounts Are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 341 (2010) (discussing the deductibility of retirement account contributions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions).
117
In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); accord In re Turner, 376 B.R.
370, 374 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2007) (finding that because voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans are
completely voluntary, the fact that the debtor took a loan against voluntary contributions does not
change the nature of the funds as they are repaid).
118
Barraza, 346 B.R. at 729-30.
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cured Debts” in the Internal Revenue Manual.119 The court did not consider, however, the fact that the categories of the Internal Revenue Manual are non-exhaustive. The court stated that 401(k) loan repayments are
not for the “health and welfare” of the debtor, nor for the production of
income; it came to this conclusion solely by evaluating the tax implications of early withdrawal, without looking to the facts and circumstances
of the petition120 as should be required under the instruction of the Internal Revenue Manual. As one author noted, “Nothing in the [Internal
Revenue] Manual makes the manditoriness [sic] of the withholding be
the sine qua non of continued employment. If ERISA121 withholding
constitutes an assignment of wages, then indeed it is mandatory, in the
sense that the ERISA plan has a fiduciary duty to enforce the assignment
mechanism.”122 The mandatory deductions from the debtor’s paycheck
are not what determine whether the expense is necessary; the court
should look to the facts and circumstances of the individual’s case.
Similarly, in In re Thompson, petitioners argued that 401(k) loan repayments were Other Necessary Expenses.123 The bankruptcy court did
not address the issue because it approved the deduction as a payment on
account of secured debts under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).124 On appeal, the
bankruptcy appellate panel said that the petitioners’ 401(k) loan repayments were an expense for which there was no alternative because the
401(k) loan obligation would only be terminated when one of the petitioners quit his job, which would have been financially irresponsible, or
repaid the loan in full, which would have been financially impossible.125
The panel looked to the facts and circumstances surrounding the petition
and found that because the 401(k) loan was taken out nineteen months
before the bankruptcy petition, in an effort to address worsening financial difficulties, deduction for 401(k) loan repayments would have been
allowed as a “special circumstance” under § 707(b)(2)(B).126 The panel
119

Id. at 730.
Id. at 730-31.
121
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et. seq.
(Westlaw 2010). ERISA was enacted by Congress in response to the growing number of private
employee retirement benefit plans. See In re Conroy, 110 B.R. 492, 494-95 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990).
122
David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 279-80 (2007).
123
In re Thompson, 350 B.R. 770, 776-77 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d sub nom. Eisen v.
Thompson, 370 B.R. 762 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
124
Id.
125
Eisen v. Thompson, 370 B.R. 762, 773 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
126
Id. at 772. The court came to this conclusion while analyzing the petitioner’s claim of
“special circumstances,” which would have rebutted the presumption of abuse under 11 U.S.C.A. §
707(b)(2)(B) (Westlaw 2010). A discussion of rebutting the presumption of abuse is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
120
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overturned the bankruptcy court’s decision on procedural grounds and
dismissed the Chapter 7 petition.127
Because the deduction of 401(k) loan repayments as Other Necessary Expenses was not addressed by the bankruptcy court, and the issue
was not preserved on appeal to the bankruptcy appellate panel, there is
no guidance from the appellate panel as to whether circumstances exist
upon which a 401(k) loan repayment could be a necessary expense.
However, as seen in this case and its appeal, courts can come to a better
conclusion only by looking to the facts and circumstances surrounding a
petition. The facts and circumstances of a petitioner’s financial situation
can provide more information that would justify considering the expense
necessary.
As in Thompson, the court in In re Lenton determined that there
may be special circumstances that under § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii) justify deducting a monthly 401(k) loan payment “for which there is no reasonable
alternative.”128 One example the court gave was a debtor originating a
401(k) loan for the purpose of reducing unsecured debt that would otherwise be paid off through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.129 Although both
courts described circumstances that justify deducting 401(k) loan repayments when petitioners were attempting to rebut the presumption of
abuse by showing “special circumstances” under § 707(b)(2)(B), both
cases are also good examples of why a court should look to the facts and
circumstances of a petition before making a determination as to the necessity of an expense.
Allowing courts the ability to look at the facts and circumstances
surrounding a petition avoids a potential hardship upon the debtor. For
example, a petitioner who has taken a 401(k) loan and used the proceeds
to repay creditors has already repaid his debt, at least in part, and the
debtor has not taken undue advantage of his creditors.130 At least one
court has advised that looking to the facts and circumstances of a petition
may be a better predictor of abuse.131 The honesty of the debtor can be
seen by examining “whether the debtor made substantial eve of bankruptcy purchases, was dishonest in filing his bankruptcy schedules and
127

Thompson, 370 B.R. at 773. Under § 707(b)(2)(B), petitioners are required to itemize such
expenses in order to rebut the presumption of abuse by showing “special circumstances.” Because
the Thompson petitioner had not itemized these expenses in his petition, the petition was dismissed.
128
In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651, 662 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006).
129
Id. (dismissing the Chapter 7 petition because the debtor’s 401(k) loan would end in the
near future, thereby leaving the petitioner with disposable income that would have been sufficient to
pay a significant amount of his or her unsecured debt).
130
See generally In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004).
131
See In re Bender, 373 B.R. 25, 28 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007).
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other court documents, and whether the bankruptcy was necessitated by
unforeseen or catastrophic events.”132
When analyzing 401(k) contributions in a Chapter 7 petition before
enactment of the BAPCPA, one bankruptcy court noted that “[p]ayments
into a retirement account can be an important aspect of a debtor’s overall
financial health and stability.”133 A number of factors can be important
in determining the necessity of contributing to a 401(k) plan, including
the age of the debtor, the monthly contribution amount, and the level of
savings already accumulated in the account.134 These factors are “among
the aspects personal to each debtor that must be considered in determining whether payments into retirement accounts should be included in
disposable income.”135 The same line of reasoning should apply to
401(k) loan repayments; there is little substantive difference between allowing money to be contributed toward retirement savings and allowing
money once contributed to be repaid for the same purpose. If anything, a
court has more evidence of abuse when looking at the reasons for which
a petitioner borrowed from a 401(k) than it does when looking at 401(k)
contributions.
Hypothetically, when a debtor takes a loan from a 401(k) he or she
likely does so for one of two reasons: for personal use, such as a vacation
or a large purchase, or to apply the loan proceeds to pay debts such as
overdue utility bills or credit card balances. Under the per-se rule set
forth in Egebjerg, these loan repayments would not qualify as necessary
expenses regardless of the use of the loan proceeds. It is unfair for bankruptcy courts to ignore the exigent circumstances surrounding a bankruptcy petition to determine whether the 401(k) loan money was used in
a fashion that is envisioned under the bankruptcy process. Had the individual not taken the loan, a bankruptcy court would not have the power
to take the money from his or her 401(k) to pay off unsecured creditors
during the bankruptcy process.136 Because of this discrepancy, it is un132

Id.
In re Hill, 328 B.R. 490, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
134
Id.; accord In re Taylor, 243 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he bankruptcy judge
may consider any factors properly before the court, including but not limited to: the age of the debtor
and the amount of time until expected retirement; the amount of the monthly contributions and the
total amount of pension contributions debtor will have to buy back if the payments are discontinued;
the likelihood that buy-back payments will jeopardize the debtor’s fresh start; the number and nature
of the debtor’s dependants; evidence that the debtor will suffer adverse employment conditions if the
contributions are ceased; the debtor’s yearly income; the debtor’s overall budget; who moved for an
order to discontinue payments; and any other constraints on the debtor that make it likely that the
pension contributions are reasonably necessary expenses for that debtor.”).
135
Hill, 328 B.R. at 495.
136
Any amount in a retirement account is not part of the bankruptcy estate and is exempt from
the reach of the courts or creditors during a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(7) (Westlaw
133
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just for a court to ignore the debtor’s motive in borrowing from a 401(k)
plan and refuse to exempt the money paid back in loan repayments as it
would be if it had never been touched before the debtor’s Chapter 7 petition.
Applying a per se disallowance of expenses under the means test, a
court has no discretion to base its ruling on whether a petitioner filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy due to inability to pay necessary expenses like
health-care costs, or whether the petitioner maxed out all his or her credit
cards and wasted his or her savings on frivolous spending.137 By not taking these factors into consideration, the means test is bound to penalize a
great many people who have fallen into bad circumstances through no
fault of their own.138 One court realized this moral dilemma, albeit before the enactment of the BAPCPA, and found a proper application of
the bankruptcy laws that respects both the definitions and rules of bankruptcy construction as well as lending practices.139 That court said,
If the trustee could establish that the pension loan at issue can be collaterally attacked as a fraudulent transfer, then we might have a different case under bankruptcy law. If, for example, the debtor used the
loan proceeds to pay for an expensive vacation for his family to go
skiing in the Swiss Alps, to go sunning on the Cote d’ Azur, to pay off
a book-maker on illegal gambling debts, or to buy his spouse or significant other a five karat diamond ring or full-length sable coat, etc.,
then the legitimacy of the loan transaction would be readily suspect.
Or if the debtor used the proceeds of the loan for the primary purpose
of acquiring assets otherwise exempt from execution at state law, then
we might have to face a difficult issue. Was this sort of ‘debtor estate
140
planning’ subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer?

The court’s per-se ruling in Egebjerg suggests that people are punished if they try to make ends meet without success. If a petitioner does
not take a loan from his or her 401(k), the funds remain protected in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.141 If the petitioner had withdrawn the
entirety of his or her 401(k) to try to make ends meet unsuccessfully,
2010).

137
A Test of Means . . . or a Mean Test?, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/bankruptcy_act02.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
138
Id.
139
In re Buchferer, 216 B.R. 332, 343 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting this moral issue but
disallowing a deduction from current monthly income the amount of a 401(k) loan on the grounds
that it is not a “loan” otherwise deductible on account of a secured debt).
140
Id.
141
11 U.S.C.A. § 541(b)(7) (Westlaw 2010).
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there would be no issue as to deducting loan repayments from current
monthly income. Because the Egebjerg petitioner withdrew only a portion of his retirement funds, the court stuck him between a rock and a
hard place with no judicial remedy available to help alleviate his financial disaster.
To ignore the facts and circumstances surrounding a petition leaves
no review of other budget items such as charitable contributions or a
lower-than-normal food or clothing allowance. Under a per-se rule,
courts will fail to analyze important factors that may determine the necessity of the expense, including the age and health of the debtor and his
or her dependents, the length of time before retirement, and the amount
of the loan repayment. Refusing to look at the financial circumstances
may cause inequitable results by allowing one debtor to properly deduct
excessive car payments or legal expenses in the amount of thousands of
dollars while denying a 401(k) loan repayment of a few hundred dollars.
B.

THE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL, THE CURRENT
STATE OF THE ECONOMY, AND PUBLIC POLICY DEMAND THAT
COURTS REEVALUATE THE IMPORTANCE OF 401(k) LOAN
REPAYMENT

A court may hold that the total amount of 401(k) loan payments is
available to creditors by disallowing a deduction, thus believing that the
amount will actually be repaid to those creditors. However, if these
payments are not allowed to continue, the petitioner suffers harsh financial penalties that will ultimately reduce the amount of money available
to creditors. This results from federal penalties that are assessed if the
loan is not repaid and the outstanding balance is treated as income for tax
purposes.142
Hypothetically, if a debtor has a $50,000 loan from his or her 401(k)
that he or she is not allowed to continue repaying, mandatory penalties
and fees will be assessed that will reduce the actual amount of additional
income available to creditors. From that $50,000, the debtor must pay
the fees associated with the loan,143 a federal ten-percent penalty,144 income tax on the amount borrowed,145 and possible state penalties and
142

In re Vansickel, 309 B.R. 189, 200-01 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004).
Generally, anywhere from 1% to 5% is charged as a processing fee. KNUTE IWASZKO &
BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 40, 188 (1999). Here, a 5% processing fee would be
equal to an additional $2,500 taken directly out of the $50,000 loan.
144
26 U.S.C.A § 72(m)(5)(B) (Westlaw 2010). Here, a 10% federal penalty amounts to a
$5,000 penalty.
145
Id. Assuming a 28% tax bracket, the petitioner would be assessed additional taxes in the
143
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state income tax on that same amount.146 In a state like California, for
example, this would leave the debtor with slightly more than half of the
loan amount, $27,250 assuming state tax of 2.5%, to pay to his or her
creditors from the $50,000 borrowed. It makes little sense to punish this
debtor so severely by taking more than half of what would have been exempted from bankruptcy simply because the debtor borrowed money
from a 401(k) plan. The money would have been protected had the debtor not taken the loan; the money should similarly be protected as it is
paid back.
A court should evaluate the net benefit to the creditors as it compares to the lost opportunity incurred by the debtor when determining
whether a 401(k) loan repayment is a necessary expense.147 If disallowing a deduction for 401(k) loan repayment would result in substantial lost
opportunity for the debtor and little benefit to the creditor, the court
should use that information to determine whether an expense should be
allowed.
Besides the obvious direct effect of taxes and penalties on the
amount of money actually available to creditors, there is a discrepancy
within the Code that remains unresolved regarding the treatment of
401(k) loan repayments. The court in Barraza found that because 401(k)
loan repayments are not included in the automatic stay along with repayments of all other debts owed to creditors, they are treated separately.148 The Barraza petitioner argued that the disallowance of a
401(k) deduction runs contrary to the exemption from the automatic stay
that applies to such wage deductions.149 In other words, the petitioner
asked “why would Congress presume under section 707(b)(2)(A) that
this amount of money could be used to pay unsecured creditors, and then
deny unsecured creditors access to that money in chapter 13” when the
disallowance would force the debtor to amend the petition to Chapter
13?150 The court admitted that it did not know the answer, yet the court
proceeded to deny the deduction.151 This discrepancy in the Code leaves
amount of $14,000.
146
For example, the California Franchise Board charges a 2.5% state tax on early distributions from a 401(k). Here, a 2.5% tax would deduct an additional $1,250 from the loan amount. To
see how this would function on a tax return, see the Franchise Tax Board Form 3805P, available at
http://www.ftb.ca.gov/forms/2009/09_3805p.pdf.
147
Vansickel, 309 B.R. at 209. The lost opportunity referenced herein is the reduction of the
future value of the 401(k) plan resulting from the discontinued repayments of a 401(k) loan, and the
forgone interest that would accrue and be paid to the taxpayer on those same amounts.
148
In re Barraza, 346 B.R. 724, 730-31 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006).
149
Id. (looking at the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (Westlaw 2010)).
150
Id. at 731.
151
Id.
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uncertainty for debtors and creditors alike and could be reconciled by
protecting both 401(k) plans and 401(k) loans from the reach of creditors
in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases.
Although the tax considerations and practicalities of repaying creditors are significant, courts should also consider the importance of condoning retirement saving for the protection of individuals and society
alike. Almost two thirds of American workers are saving little or nothing for retirement.152 With the Social Security Trust Fund projected to
run a cash flow deficit of $680,000,000,000 by the year 2035, and the
number of beneficiaries per 100 workers jumping from about 30 to almost 50, it is questionable whether Social Security will be able to serve
as the sole support for the coming generation of retirees.153
Social Security’s current problems are serious because the system
was never intended to be the sole source of retirement income for Americans.154 The system functions on the theory that current contributions
paid by today’s labor force finance the benefits taken by today’s retirees.155 Social Security and pension benefits constitute about 43% of a
person’s retirement income.156 The other 57% will have to come from
personal savings and retirement accounts such as 401(k)s.157 The system
worked when people only lived into their sixties, but now it cannot possibly keep up with the demand for benefits from people who will spend
twenty or thirty years in retirement, rather than five or ten as originally
anticipated.158 Taxpayers cannot rely on the federal government to support them during retirement, and for this reason, the judiciary should not
deny individuals the ability to continue supporting themselves. By disallowing the repayment of 401(k) loans, courts are burdening society with
the added cost of supporting retirement for those petitioners who could
repay their retirement loans and rely less on the Social Security Trust
Fund.
Many courts have agreed on the importance of saving for retirement;159 however, they have neglected to allow this to affect their deci152

KNUTE IWASZKO & BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 133 (1999).
Allan Sloan, The Next Big Bailout: Social Security, FORTUNE, July 30, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/29/news/economy/fixing_social_security.fortune.
154
TED BENNA & BRENDA WATSON NEWMANN, 401(k)S FOR DUMMIES 18 (2003).
155
SUZE ORMAN, THE MONEY BOOK FOR THE YOUNG, FABULOUS & BROKE 176 (2005).
156
KNUTE IWASZKO & BRIAN O’CONNELL, THE 401(k) MILLIONAIRE 16 (1999).
157
Id.
158
SUZE ORMAN, THE MONEY BOOK FOR THE YOUNG, FABULOUS & BROKE 176 (2005).
159
E.g., In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167, 173 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010) (“While saving for retirement
may be prudent, it is generally unnecessary in bankruptcy . . . .”); In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492, 503
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that although “saving money for retirement certainly is a prudent
investment . . . debtors should not be permitted to pay themselves money at the expense of credi153
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sion on the deductibility of 401(k) loan repayments from a debtor’s current monthly income. Prior to the enactment of the BAPCA, a bankruptcy court realized this problem and emphasized the “critical importance for every American adult to invest prudently in his or her
retirement income for the duration of his or her entire working life.”160
The court went on to criticize the modern interpretation that reasonably
necessary expenses are limited to current daily needs, arguing that that
view “is both unrealistic and, frankly, short-sighted under the true conditions of economic life in the United States.”161
Courts should look to the practical effect of denying deductions for
the repayment of 401(k) loans. While it could be perceived that creditors
will benefit in the same amount as the remaining balance of a 401(k)
loan, this does not anticipate the fact that the balance is reduced by penalties and taxes associated with early withdrawal from 401(k) plans. Additionally, in this current economic state, courts should realize the effect
of their decisions on debtors whose retirement savings will be needed to
supplement Social Security. Therefore, allowing the deduction of 401(k)
loan repayments in Chapter 7 bankruptcy is not only fair but also in accordance with the public policy of encouraging investment in retirement.
C.

COURTS CAN RELY ON THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST TO DISMISS ABUSIVE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS

Regardless of the outcome of the presumption of abuse under the
means test, the BAPCPA created another distinct test that provides courts
with a second opportunity to dismiss abusive petitions.162 In In re Zaporski, the court determined that another policy reason for allowing deductions is that doing so does not mean a debtor’s case will avoid dismissal.163 It simply means that the debtor may avoid the presumption of
abuse.164 The United States Trustee can still request dismissal under §
707(b)(3) either for filing in bad faith, or because a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis evidences abuse.165
Prior to the BAPCPA’s establishment of the means test, courts
tors”).

160

In re Awuku, 248 B.R. 21, 31-32 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000).
Id.
162
See Adam J. Ruttenberg, The Totality of What Circumstances? How Courts Determine
Whether Granting Bankruptcy Relief Would Be an Abuse, 2009 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, Part
II, § 4 (2009) (examining cases where debtors face dismissal under § 707(b)(3)).
163
In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 768 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007).
164
Id.
165
Id.
161
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looked to a number of factors for determining substantial abuse under the
former totality-of-the-circumstances test, namely: (1) whether there was
a likelihood of future income to fund the debtor’s Chapter 11, 12, or 13
plan; (2) whether the petition was filed as a consequence of illness, disability, unemployment, or other calamity; (3) whether the schedules suggested that the debtor obtained cash advances and consumer goods without the ability to repay; (4) whether the debtor’s proposed family budget
was excessive or extravagant; (5) whether the debtor’s papers misrepresented his or her financial condition; and (6) whether the debtor engaged
in eve-of-bankruptcy purchases.166 Similarly, after the enactment of the
BAPCPA, the court in In re Walker provided an almost identical eightpoint list of the other factors that it would consider in determining
whether a debtor’s financial situation demonstrated abuse.167
At present, even if not subject to the means test, or after debtors
have successfully rebutted the presumption of abuse of § 707(b), they are
still subject to the test for abuse set forth in § 707(b)(3)(B).168 For a debtor who is subject to the means test, it is not essential for the court to determine whether payments toward a 401(k) loan are necessary expenses
because the same determination is made when analyzing the petition under the totality-of-the-circumstances test for abuse. Therefore, courts can
save judicial resources by avoiding this tedious process in the means test
calculations and presume that payments to a 401(k) loan are necessary
expenses under § 707(a). This result allows debtors subject to the means
test the opportunity to fully present their financial status to the courts
without affecting the courts’ ultimate ability to dismiss abusive petitions.
Courts and commentators find it difficult to understand the relationship between the means test of § 707(b)(2) and the totality-of-thecircumstances test of § 707(b)(3).169 Courts have agreed that “the Means
Test is only the first step in determining whether a debtor’s petition is
abusive. [It] functions as an initial screen to weed out those Chapter 7

166

In re Price, 353 F.3d 1135, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2004).
In re Walker, 383 B.R. 830, 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2008). This list of factors includes
(1) whether the bankruptcy filing was precipitated by an unforeseen catastrophic event, such as a
sudden illness or unemployment; (2) whether the debtor is eligible for Chapter 13 relief; (3) whether
there are non-bankruptcy remedies available to the debtor; (4) whether the debtor can obtain relief
through private negotiations; (5) whether the debtor’s proposed budget is excessive or unreasonable;
(6) whether the debtor has a stable source of future income; (7) whether the debtor could provide a
meaningful distribution in a Chapter 13 case; and (8) whether the debtor’s expenses could be reduced significantly without depriving the debtor and dependents of necessities.
168
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(B) (Westlaw 2010).
169
In re Jensen, 407 B.R. 378, 383 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing In re Johnson, 399 B.R.
72, 75 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2008)).
167
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petitions that are most clearly abusive.”170
The totality-of-thecircumstances test provides a “backstop” that weighs unusual circumstances not considered under the means test.171 However, the policies
implicit in the means test must be respected by the totality-of-thecircumstances test.172 It is the Trustee that has the power to request dismissal under the totality-of-the-circumstances test.173 Therefore, it is judicially fair to give deference to the claims of the petitioner under the
means test while relying on the “backstop” of the totality-of-thecircumstances test to determine abuse.
Some debtors have argued that if no presumption of abuse arises
under the means test, then the ability to pay creditors cannot be taken into account in applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, suggesting
that Congress created the means test to be exclusive and conclusive regarding ability to pay.174 Courts have regularly rejected this argument
and reserved the right to review the surrounding facts and circumstances
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test for abuse of a petition before
granting relief.175 In In re Zaporski, for example, the court explained that
§ 707(b)(3)(B) instructs a court to consider the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s financial situation.176 The court stated:
This plain language is broad enough to encompass, indeed require,
consideration of those facts that are probative of a debtor’s ability to
repay his or her creditors. Such facts are in this Court’s view a circumstance of that debtor’s “financial situation” even where the debtor’s petition is not filed in bad faith and even where the statutory pre177
sumption of abuse has not arisen . . . .

Correspondingly, regardless of the outcome under the means test, courts
are instructed to look to the facts and circumstances of a debtor’s financial situation before dismissing a petition. Debtors should have the same
ability to defend claims of necessary deductions under the means test to
avoid prejudice before dismissal.
170

Id at 384; see also In re Fowler, 349 B.R. 414, 420-21 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (explaining
that Congress’s intent was to create an easily applied formula to determine whether a court should
presume abuse of Chapter 7).
171
Jensen, 401 B.R. at 384.
172
Id. at 385-86.
173
11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) (Westlaw 2010).
174
Adam J. Ruttenberg, The Totality of What Circumstances? How Courts Determine Whether Granting Bankruptcy Relief Would Be an Abuse, ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW, Part II, § 4 (2009).
175
Id.
176
In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758, 770-71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007).
177
Id. at 771.
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Several courts have held that voluntary contributions to a 401(k)
plan generally should not be considered reasonably necessary expenses
under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.178 In In re Parada, the
court stated that “[b]ankruptcy courts, while recognizing that saving
money for retirement certainly is a prudent investment, have consistently
held that debtors should not be permitted to pay themselves money at the
expense of creditors.”179 Noting that the debtors in that case were
“young and, hopefully, will have many years of gainful employment to
work towards retirement,” the court found they had an ability to pay and
ordered their case dismissed.180 This supports the conclusion that the
means test is less conclusive than the totality-of-the-circumstances test.
For that reason, courts should not put so much emphasis on the means
test. In time, a court will look to the facts and circumstances surrounding
the petition, which will give a clearer picture of whether the petitioner is
abusing the relief of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
There would be no judicial harm in considering the repayment of a
401(k) loan a necessary expense under the means test. Even if the presumption of abuse is successfully avoided under the means test, this fallback provision grants a court the power to dismiss a case regardless of
whether 401(k) loan repayments are determined to be a necessary expense. Evidenced by the interplay of these two tests, the BAPCPA did
not change the totality-of-the-circumstances test that courts use in Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions. In pre-BAPCPA cases, courts did not disallow deductions from current monthly income without looking to the facts
and circumstances surrounding petitions. Using similar factors in looking at the totality of the circumstances in pre- and post-BAPCPA cases,
courts should not apply a per-se rule disallowing such deductions.
CONCLUSION
Understandably, courts have a delicate job balancing between protecting creditors from people not paying their debts and protecting citizens who will never truly be able to pay back their debts. This is a difficult balance, and through the BAPCPA, Congress has decidedly tipped
the scale in favor of creditors by holding people responsible for their financial mistakes and broadening the circumstances that justify denial of
petitions. Accordingly, courts have interpreted the means test in such a
178
See, e.g., In re Behlke, 358 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Parada, 391 B.R. 492, 502
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Zaporski, 366 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2007); In re Cox, 249 B.R.
29 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
179
Parada, 391 B.R. at 503.
180
Id.
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way that it is nearly impossible for some debtors to obtain relief in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. By not being allowed to make deductions for 401(k)
loan repayments, debtors will not only have their cases dismissed for
abuse but will also suffer the financial consequences of outstanding
401(k) loans that are considered early withdrawals.
In fairness, courts should look to the facts and circumstances of a
petitioner’s financial situation before determining whether an expense is
reasonably necessary. The categorical deductions in the Internal Revenue Manual’s Other Necessary Expenses are non-exhaustive. A per-se
rule disallowing any deduction is prejudicial and bankruptcy courts
should avoid letting a blanket disallowance of a deduction to preclude an
analysis of the debtor’s financial situation.
Additionally, a court should look to the impact of its decision before
dismissing a Chapter 7 petition on the basis of abuse. Not only is the
debtor required to pay taxes and fees for an early withdrawal, but creditors will not necessarily receive the money dedicated to repayment of the
loan. With Social Security expected to fall into a deeper deficit, courts
should give deference to those individuals attempting to save for their
own retirement and avoid future reliance on an already failing federal retirement system.
Finally, it does no harm to allow deduction for 401(k) loan repayments under the means test because the court can use the “backstop” of
the totality-of-the-circumstances test to dismiss abusive petitions. Because the Trustee has the power to request dismissal under the totalityof-the-circumstances test, it would be even more prejudicial not to give
deference to the petitioner under the means test. In its present state, the
BAPCPA stacks the cards against a petitioner by providing multiple
ways in which the court can dismiss a petition under Chapter 7.
Only a change in judicial interpretation can resolve this issue. The
courts should interpret current provisions in the BAPCPA to find that
401(k) loan repayments can be a reasonably necessary expense when
looking to the facts and circumstances surrounding a petition.
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